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Abstract
Paying negative interest rates on central bank digital currency (CBDC) be-
comes increasingly relevant to monetary operations, since several major central
banks have been actively exploring both negative interest rate policy and CBDC
after the Great Recession. This paper provides a formal analysis to evaluate the
macroeconomic impact of negative interest rates on CBDC through the lens of a
neoclassical general equilibrium model with monetary aggregates. In the bench-
mark model, agents have access to two types of assets: CBDC and productive
capital. The demand for digital currency is motivated by a liquidity constraint.
I show that paying negative interest on CBDC induces agents to save less and
consume more via a substitution e¤ect. A drop in savings in turn causes a fall
in capital investment, subsequent output, and real money balances. To clear
the money market, the price level increases. I then extend the model to include
government bonds which deliver a positive return. This allows me to study a
non-trivial portfolio e¤ect: when the government pays a negative interest rate on
CBDC, the tax on agents capital spending increases, inducing a decrease in cap-
ital investment and an increase in government bonds in agents portfolio. Such
a policy causes a drop in investment and output. However, there is a transitory
decline in the price level due to a "ight to quality".
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"After all, even today when the door to negative rates is cracked only slightly ajar,
several major central banks (including the Bank of Japan and the European Central
Bank) have already shoved a foot through. Thus it is important to think about phasing
out cash and developing negative interest rate policy in an integrative fashion...
For the foreseeable future, however, the best system is one in which a government
issued currency is the unit of account, though of course it will eventually morph into a
fully electronic one."
Kenneth S. Rogo¤ (2016) in The Curse of Cash
1 Introduction
One of the great challenges for central banks is the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal
interest rates. The logic is simple: since physical cash serves as a store of value and
guarantees a nominal return of zero, agents would be unwilling to lend at any lower
rates, making zero as the e¤ective interest rate oor. This key constraint results in a
notable asymmetry in the implementation of central bank policy.1 When the economy
is booming and ination threatens to rise to undesirable levels, the central bank can
tighten monetary policy by raising the o¢cial interest rate. When the economy is
in a severe recession and ination is direly needed, the policy rate simply cannot be
lowered below zero to provide an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation. If
a further stimulus is desired, the monetary authority may have to deploy unconven-
tional monetary policy tools, such as quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance.
But many researchers are rightly concerned that these unorthodox measures are poor
substitutes for plain vanilla interest rate policy and might well have more side-e¤ects
(Rogo¤, 2017a).
Macroeconomists have proposed ways to nesse the zero lower bound, and the most
direct approach is to abolish paper currency and pay negative interest rates on central
bank electronic liabilities, such as central bank digital currency (CBDC) (see Buiter,
1The ZLB constraint is also the key assumption behind a large literature in macroeconomics, for
early contributions, see, for example, Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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2009; Fischer, 2016; Rogo¤, 2015, 2016, 2017b).2 In recent decades, the increasing
marginalization of cash in legal transactions and the technological advances in payment
systems have created a smooth path towards this policy. Rogo¤ (2015) has made it
clear that there are two important drawbacks to paper currency: rst, its existence
creates the artifact of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate; second, it
can help facilitate crime and tax evasion.3 He argues that it would be appropriate to
take a more proactive strategy for phasing out the use of paper currency.4 In fact, in
Sweden, the embracement of technological developments in payment systems has led
to an absolute decline in the amount of cash in circulation, making Sweden close to
becoming a cashless society.
Recent experience from the aftermath of the Great Recession has shown that paying
negative interest rates on central bank liabilities is also possible. Since mid-2014,
central banks in Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, and the Euro Area have tiptoed
into negative rate territory for the rst time in history, going as far as  0:75 percent
in Switzerland for instance (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016; Eggertsson et al., 2017). The
implementation of negative policy rates represents a newmonetary policy tool. In doing
so, central banks typically set the interest on reserves (IOR) to negative levels, and
this appears to have no major changes to central bank monetary frameworks (see Bech
and Malkhozov, 2016).5 Since then, there has been a growing interest in evaluating
the e¤ects of negative interest rates, both theoretically and empirically, mainly on the
banking sector (see Rognlie, 2016; Eggertsson et al., 2017; Basten and Mariathasan,
2Note that there are alternative measures to mitigate the constraints associated with the ZLB,
such as taxing cash to pay negative interest on currency (Buiter, 2009) and raising the ination target
(Fischer, 2016).
3Apart from the two drawbacks, Berentsen and Schär (2016) also note that the use of cash is
ine¢cient and signicantly more expensive than electronic payments from a technological perspective.
4Rogo¤ (2016) explicitly states that "phasing out paper currency is arguably the simplest and
most elegant approach to clearing the path for central banks to invoke unfettered negative interest
rate policies should they bump up against the zero lower bound on interest rates."
5Of course, there is nothing impractical at all about paying negative interest on electronic currency.
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2018; Ulate, 2019; Arseneau, 2020; Lopez et al., 2020). It is important to note, however,
such investigations are only concerned with one type of central bank liabilities (i.e.,
bank reserves).6 Given that only designated nancial institutions (mostly commercial
banks) can hold reserves, the key of the studies lies on how banks intermediate the
transmission of monetary policy.
In the meanwhile, as recent technological advancements in cryptographic and dis-
tributed ledger techniques (DLT) have made digital currencies widely accessible, central
banks around the world are now actively exploring the possibility of issuing their own
digital currencies.7 Although the idea of providing greater access to digital forms of
central bank liabilities is not entirely new, dating at least back to Tobin (1985, 1987),
recent discussions on issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) have been moti-
vated by a number of factors.8 These include: (i) interest in technological innovations
for the nancial sector; (ii) the emergence of new entrants into payment services and
intermediation; (iii) declining use of physical currency in a few countries; (iv) increas-
ing attention to private digital tokens (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) (see BIS, 2018).9
6Currently, there are two types of central bank money. One is physical currency (notes and coins),
which is anonymous and made accessible to everyone; another one is central bank reserves, which are
in electronic form and accessible to certain nancial institutions only.
7For example, the Swedish Riksbank and the Peoples Bank of China are expected to decide on
initiating CBDCs in the near term (Agur et al., 2020), the Bank of England is conducting a multi-
year investigation (Bordo and Levin, 2017), and the Bank of Japan has reported on the legal issues
regarding CBDCs (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2020). Barontini and Holden (2019) provide a survey
of 63 central banks, which shows a majority are collaboratively looking at the implications of a CBDC
and many have reached a stage of considering practical issues. One year on, the survey has been re-run
(Boar et al., 2020). Boar et al. (2020) nd that a signicant minority of central banks representing a
fth of the worlds population look likely to issue a CBDC in the next few years.
8There are also skeptics who warn against the introduction of a CBDC. Some frequently-made
arguments are: such a policy would cause a reduction in bank credit, with negative implications
for growth; the issuance of a CBDC could encourage depositor runs and threaten nancial stability.
However, Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) claim that these arguments are questionable. They show
that, with a strong institutional commitment, a transfer of funds from deposit to CBDC accounts
would give rise to an automatic substitution of one type of bank funding (deposits) by another one
(central bank funding)the issuance of a CBDC would simply render the central banks implicit
lender-of-last-resort guarantee explicit. Thus, introducing a CBDC need not imply a credit crunch
nor undermine nancial stability.
9Noted by Berentsen and Schär (2016), another benet for issuing a CBDC is that it can satisfy
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Note that, although CBDC can be used to refer to a number of concepts, it is en-
visioned by most to be a new form of central bank issued, account-based, electronic
currency, which is made accessible to the general public (see Barrdear and Kumhof,
2016; Berentsen and Schär, 2016; Keister and Sanches, 2019; Andolfatto, 2020).10 In
this regard, introducing CBDCs allows "Reserves for All" (Niepelt, 2020) or "Central
Banking for All" (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2020).
There is little doubt that the introduction of both a CBDC and negative interest
rate policy represents important innovations in the history of central banking. The
implementation of such macroeconomic policies is likely to have substantial e¤ects
on economic activities. It also raises important questions. What if central banks
start to pay negative interest on CBDC? What is the economic impact of such a
policy? In particular, how would paying negative interest on CBDC a¤ect consumption,
investment, output, and the price level? Given the fact that several major economies
around the globe are actively exploring both negative interest rate policies and a CBDC,
paying a negative interest rate on CBDC is becoming increasingly relevant.11 At a
macroeconomic level, however, the implications of such a policy are not understood.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to provide a formal evaluation of
negative interest rates on CBDC.
In this paper, I evaluate the macroeconomic impact of negative interest rates on
central bank digital currency (CBDC) through the lens of a neoclassical general equilib-
rium model with monetary aggregates. I use an overlapping generations (OLG) model
with at money, similar to Wallace (1980) and Smith (1991). In the benchmark model,
the populations need for virtual money without facing counterparty risk.
10As noted above, central bank electronic money has already existed (i.e., reserves), but it is gen-
erally restricted to nancial institutions with which the central bank interacts.
11There has been no country which paid negative interest rates on CBDC, yet. In this sense,
this paper provides a normative, instead of positive, investigation. However, for countries which are
intensively examining both the e¤ects of negative interest rates and a CBDC, such as Sweden, paying
negative interest on CBDC may not seem to be far o¤.
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agents hold two types of assets: CBDC and productive capital. To motivate a demand
for government money in a simple and direct way, I assume agents are subject to a
binding liquidity requirement (or a reserve requirement) such that they are required to
hold a certain amount of CBDC that is proportional to their capital holdings. The key
mechanism in this environment is a substitution e¤ect. If the government pays negative
interest on CBDC, agents would reduce their savings due to a fall in the anticipated rate
of return, and choose to consume more (i.e., current consumption increases). However,
as savings decrease, so does investment, which results in a fall in subsequent output.
In addition, this policy measure causes an increase in the price level. This is because a
reduction in savings implies a smaller demand for government money. Since the stock
of CBDC is xed in this modelling environment, the price level has to increase to clear
the money market. Finally, I show that paying negative interest rates on CBDC can
be detrimental for all agents from a welfare perspective. The initial old are hurt as
real money balances fall. Other generations are also worse o¤ since negative interest
payments on CBDC represent a distortionary tax to savings.
Then, I extend the model to include another important type of public money,
namely government debt.12 With the existence of positive-yielding government bonds,
I show that a non-trivial portfolio e¤ect emerges. As the government pays negative
interest rates on CBDC, the tax on capital spending increases, which induces agents to
hold more bonds and less capital in their portfolio. The drop in capital investment in
turn causes a decline in output in the subsequent period. Interestingly, although the
demand for CBDC falls, the total holdings of government money actually increase, due
to a "ight to quality" (i.e., government bonds). To clear the money market, the price
level drops, causing deationary pressures. Taken together, both cases show that there
are costs and benets to negative interest payments on CBDC. One the one hand, such
12Note that if one considers a consolidated monetary/scal authority, government bonds can also
be viewed as public money.
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a policy could boost consumption via agents consumption/saving decision and induce
inationary pressures if ination is direly needed by central banks. On the other hand,
paying a negative interest rate on CBDC can cause a decrease in capital investment and
GDP, either from a substitution e¤ect or a portfolio e¤ect. In addition, it is possible
that such a policy measure induces a decline in the temporary price level if the total
demand for public money increases. Finally, the results indicate that the payment of
negative interest on CBDC does not seem to have clear welfare justications.
Related Literature. This paper relates closely to two important branches of
monetary economics. One is a growing and evolving literature on CBDC. Barrdear
and Kumhof (2016) introduce a CBDC into a quantitative DSGE model to estimate
its impact on GDP. Their simulations show that the initiation of CBDC through pur-
chasing government bonds can lower the real interest rate and thereby increase output.
Quantitatively, they nd that CBDC issuance of 30% of GDP could permanently raise
GDP by as much as 3%. Davoodalhosseini (2018) studies the role of a CBDC as a new
monetary instrument. His focus is on how the introduction of a digital currency a¤ects
the use of cash and on its implications for monetary policy. Agur et al. (2020) study
the optimal design of a CBDC in an environment where agents sort into physical cash,
CBDC, and bank deposits based on their preferences over anonymity and security.
They nd that a deposit-like CBDC causes an increase in deposit and loan rates, and
a contraction in bank credit and output, whereas a cash-like CBDC may lead to the
disappearance of cash.
Keister and Sanches (2019) also study a cash-like digital currency, but with a focus
on the implications of a CBDC that competes with bank deposits. In their model,
banks are nancially constrained, and the liquidity premium on bank deposits a¤ects
the level of aggregate investment. They show that while a CBDC promotes e¢ciency in
exchange, it also crowds out banks deposits, raises banks funding costs, and decreases
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investment. Similarly, Chiu et al. (2019) develop a micro-founded general equilibrium
model and evaluate whether the issuance of a CBDC is likely to increase banks fund-
ing costs and cause disintermediation in banks. However, they nd that when banks
have market powers in the deposit market, the introduction of a CBDC can compel
banks to raise the deposit rate and expand intermediation and output. Andolfatto
(2020) also studies the e¤ect of a CBDC on bank intermediation. In an environment
with a monopoly bank, he shows that introducing a CBDC a¤ects the interest rate
on deposits, but not the bank lending rate or the level of investment. Overall, the
results of aforementioned studies are mixed regarding the role of CBDC issuance on
nancial intermediation. However, none of the papers studies the e¤ects of negative
interest payments on CBDC. And unlike the above studies, this paper focuses on the
macroeconomic impact of negative interest rates on CBDC, not on money demand or
bank intermediation.
Another strand of literature examines the e¤ects of negative interest rate policies.
Rognlie (2016) studies optimal monetary policy in a continuous New Keynesian model
where agents hold both physical cash and government bonds. He nds that there exists
a trade-o¤: negative rates on bonds help stabilize aggregate demand, but at the cost
of an ine¢cient subsidy to paper currency. His results show that when the economy is
in a slump, negative rate policies are always optimal to some degree and that breaking
the ZLB with negative rates brings signicant welfare improvements. Eggertsson et
al. (2017) examines the proposition that negative interest rates are expansionary in
a DSGE model with a banking sector. Using aggregate and bank-level data, they
document a collapse in pass-through to deposit and lending rates once the IOR rate
becomes negative.13 Their results show that once the policy rate turns negative, the
usual transmission mechanism of monetary policy breaks down. In addition, because
13Bech and Malkhozov (2016) also note that retail deposit rates have remained insulated in response
to negative policy rates.
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a negative interest rate on reserves reduces bank prots, the total e¤ect on aggregate
output can be contractionary. Contrary to their results, Ulate (2019) investigates the
same question but nds that negative rates can stimulate the economy by lowering
the rates that commercial banks charge on loans, while they can also erode bank
protability by squeezing deposit spreads. Yet, there is no consensus on the e¤ects
of negative interest rate policies.14 Di¤erent from these contributions, the focus of
this paper is on the macroeconomic impact of negative rates, in a "reserves for all"
economy where the role of a CBDC is carefully examined. Thus, this study forms a
bridge between the two strands of literature. The novel contribution of this paper is to
provide a formal investigation into the e¤ects of negative interest payments on CBDC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I lay out the phys-
ical structure of the benchmark economyindividual preferences, demographics, and
technologies. I also derive the equilibrium of the baseline model. Section 3 evaluates
the economic implications of negative interest rates on CBDC. In Section 4, I extend
the model to include government debt, and discuss the impact of such a policy via a
portfolio e¤ect. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
14Note that there is also a growing empirical literature that studies the impact of negative rates
on commercial banks. For example, Basten and Mariathasan (2018) analyze the e¤ect of negative
interest rates on banks, using detailed supervisory information from Switzerland. They nd that
more a¤ected banks reduce costly reserves and bond nancing while maintaining non-negative deposit
rates. Banks portfolio rebalancing implies relatively more lending, compared to an earlier rate cut
within positive territory. Arseneau (2020) uses supervisory data to examine bank-level expectations
regarding the impact of negative rates on protability through net interest margins. He nds that
the most signicant channel of adverse exposure comes from the pass-through of negative rates to
short-term liquid assets held on the balance sheet. On the liability side, banks that rely more heavily
on short-term wholesale funding may benet from a reduction in funding costs. Lopez et al. (2020)
explore the impact of negative policy rates on banks using data on 5200 banks from 27 advanced
European and Asian countries, 20102017. Their results show that banks o¤set interest income losses
under negative rates with lower deposit expenses and gains in non-interest income. Banks also increase
their lending activity and raise their share of deposit funding in response to a negative interest rate.
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2 The benchmark model
I base my analysis on a neoclassical general equilibrium model with at money à la
Wallace (1980) and Smith (1991).15 The model economy is populated by two-period-
lived overlapping generations (OLG). Time is indexed by t = 1; 2; :::;1. Within each
period t, two generations coexistthose in the rst period of their life (the "young")
and those in the last period of their life (the "old"). There is a set of young agents born
in each period t  1, all of whom are identical. In the initial period, t = 1, there is also
a set of initial old agents called the initial old, who live for one period. All generations
have equal number of N agents.
There exist two assets in the economycentral bank digital currency (CBDC) and
productive capital.16 For ease of exposition, I assume, at t = 1, a constant per capita
stock of CBDC of m = 1 is created by the government and passed to the initial
old.17 The initial old want as much of consumption good in period 1 as possible, and
their welfare is monotonically increasing in consumption. Young agents have the twice
continuously di¤erentiable utility function: U(c1) + V (c2), where cj stands for age j
consumption; j = 1; 2. It is further assumed that U
0
> 0; V
0
> 0; and U
00
 0; V
00
< 0.
To ensure an interior solution, U 0(0) and V 0(0) are assumed innite. Each young
15Central bank digital currency (CBDC) is at money. Noted by Wallace (1980), there are two
widely accepted dening characteristics of at money: inconvertibility and intrinsic uselessness. In-
convertibility means that the issuer does not promise to convert the money into anything else. Intrinsic
uselessness means that at money is never wanted for its won sake; it is not legitimate to take at
money to be an argument of anyones utility function or of any production function. In addition,
what di¤ers CBDC from private cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum (both are incon-
vertible and intrinsically useless), is that CBDC is valid as legal tender and thus issued by monetary
authorities.
16That is, there is only one type of monetary asset in the benchmark economy. Government bonds
with a positive net return are later introduced in Section 4.
17One can view that the initial old open digital accounts at the central bank and receive the "gift"
of the initial stock of CBDC. This is de facto "helicopter money". However, whether agents hold funds
electronically in CBDC accounts at the central bank or in specially designated accounts at supervised
depository institutions (e.g., commercial banks) is irrelevant to my analysis. In reality, it is likely that
a stock of CBDC is rstly injected to a small part of the population, e.g., government employees or
project contractors, and then it gets circulated among the whole population.
10
agent has an endowment y > 0 of consumption good when young, and agents have no
endowment of the good when old.18 A unit of the consumption good at t that is not
consumed may be used to create a unit of capital. The problem facing agents is how
to nance consumption when old.
Savings of each young agent take the form of CBDC and capital investment, which
o¤er di¤erent rates of return. When invested, the consumption good returns x > 1
units of the consumption good in period t + 1 for each unit invested in period t. As
previously mentioned, the initial old are endowed with m units of CBDC.19 The young
can trade a unit of the consumption good for pt units of CBDC, that is, CBDC serves
as a unit of account. In period t + 1, in the absence of negative interest payments on
CBDC, the old (the young of period t) trade each unit of CBDC for 1=pt+1 units of
the consumption good. Thus, the rate of return on CBDC held by the old is pt=pt+1.
With negative interest rates on CBDC, however, I assume CBDC earns the real return
(1 + ), where  2 ( 1; 0) is a new monetary policy tool and denotes the net negative
interest rate for each unit of digital currency held in CBDC accounts.20 Note that for
generations born at t > 1, agents store part of their savings in CBDC when young,
which is carried over when old. In period t + 1, the old (born in period t) exchange
digital currency for consumption good from the young (born in period t + 1). Thus,
CBDC is also a store of value and serves as a medium of exchange, and it is made
accessible to all generations.
By construction, CBDC is dominated in rate of return by storage capital, i.e.,
(1 + ) < x. It is important to note that, technically, CBDC could lose its value in
18Alternatively, one can think of the young as being endowed with a unit of labor or time that can
be transformed into y units of the consumption good.
19Of course, the stock of CBDC can be assumed to grow (or fall), following some quantity rule,
which is also a monetary policy instrument. Given the focus of analysis is on the economic impact
of negative interest rates on CBDC, I do not allow the stock of at money to vary in the benchmark
economy.
20While the scheme just described has the government setting the real return on CBDC, it is easy
to verify that having the government set the nominal returns has the same consequences.
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this modelling environment. Suppose that all young agents are identical and have the
same productive storage, but that they cannot store their own goods. Therefore each
young agent at t deposits some resources to a "bank", which intermediates storage of
the good. The bank issues paper IOUs to the depositors and promises them to pay x
units of the consumption good in period t + 1 for every unit of the good deposited in
period t. These privately created paper IOUs serve as inside money, with a positive
net return x   1 > 0. If agents prefer inside private money to outside public money
(i.e., CBDC), at money will lose its value, and prices would have to be expressed in
some other unit of account.21 In this case, if the government still wishes to maintain
at money as a unit of account, it must force people to hold CBDC. There are many
ways for the government to shore up the demand for at money. Most directly, it can
simply require agents to hold a certain amount of CBDC.22 In this "reserves for all"
economy (see Niepelt, 2020), I assume all young agents face the legal requirement of
holding CBDC, a pro rata share of their capital investment.23
Let kt denote the quantity of the good invested by young agents at t, and let mt
denote their holdings of real CBDC balances. All young agents are required by law
to hold a certain amount of CBDC, mt  kt, where  2 [0; 1] can be interpreted
as liquidity requirements or reserve requirements. Throughout the focus will be on
equilibria in which this legal restriction is binding. In every period after the initial
period, holding CBDC earns negative net interest for each unit held in required CBDC.
Assume a lump-sum subsidy of  t  0 units of the consumption good is distributed to
each old agent at t > 1.
21Notice that the old in period t cannot credibly issue inside money as they die at the end of period
t+ 1.
22It is in the same spirit of the legal requirement discussed by Champ and Freeman (1990) and
Smith (1991).
23Note that in reality the government does impose regulations (e.g., reserve requirements and liq-
uidity requirements) that explicitly require agents (mostly commercial banks) who have access to
government digital currency (i.e., central bank reserves), to hold at money.
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2.1 Behavior of young agents
Taking government subsidies f tg as given, young agents at each date t choose mt and
kt(kt  0) to maximize U(c1) + V (c2) subject to:
c1 + kt +mt = y; (1)
c2 = xkt + (1 + )mt +  t+1; (2)
mt  kt: (3)
Note that since the focus is on equilibria where equation (3) is binding, this problem
can be transformed as follows.24 Let Qt denote total savings of a young agent at t, so
that Qt = (1 + )kt, let  = (1 + )
 1, and let R  x+ (1  )(1 + ). Then  is the
weight placed on capital in each young agents portfolio, and R is the appropriately
weighted return on this portfolio faced by a young agent at t. Each young agent then
chooses his personal savings Qt 2 [0; y] to maximize U(y  Qt) + V (RQt +  t+1). The
rst-order condition for this "consumption-saving" problem is:
U
0
(y  Qt) = RV
0
(RQt +  t+1): (4)
The above equation also implicitly implies a savings function Qt = f(R), to be
discussed in detail below. In addition, note that in the absence of negative interest
payments, these digital money earns the (gross) real return pt=pt+1. Hence per capita
24Given that (1+ ) < x, as previously assumed, equation (3) is in fact binding, that is, agents will
not hold extra CBDC in their accounts since the return on at money is lower than that on productive
capital.
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government interest revenues at t + 1 are (1   )[(pt=pt+1)   (1 + )]Qt. Following
the assumption that interest revenues are appropriated for subsidies  t+1 to the old,
government budget balance requires that:
 t+1 = (1  )[(pt=pt+1)  (1 + )]Qt: (5)
2.2 Equilibrium
In what follows, I restrict attention to deterministic stationary allocations. A stationary
equilibrium is a vector (Q;m; p) that depends on a policy vector (; ), satisfying
equations (4), (5), mt = kt = [=(1+)]Qt, and the money market clearing condition:
m = mtpt = 1; (6)
for all t  1.25 Note that equation (6) determines the price level in the economy. That
is, the price level can still be well-dened in this cashless economy. The money market
clearing condition also helps us to understand the transitory changes in the price level.
For instance, it directly follows from equation (6) that in response to a fall in the
demand for CBDC (i.e., a lower mt), the price level has to increase to clear the money
market, which in turn induces inationary pressures.
Substitution of (5) into (4) gives the equilibrium law of motion for Qt:
U
0
(y  Qt) = RV
0
[xQt + (1  )Qt+1]; (7)
where Qt+1=Qt = mt+1=mt = pt=pt+1 has been used in equation (7). It is important
to note that in equilibrium, the wealth e¤ect of the decreased rate of return on private
savings is exactly o¤set by the increased subsidies,
25Note that  2 ( 1; 0) is exogenously set by the government.
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c2 = xQ+ (1  )(1 + )Q  (1  )Q = [x+ (1  )]Q; (8)
leaving only a substitution e¤ect.
Note that the locus dened by equation (7) has a slope:
dQt+1
dQt
=
 U
00
 RxV
00
R(1  )V 00
< 0: (9)
And there exists a unique (non-zero) monetary steady state value for Qt, denoted
by Q, satisfying:
U
0
(y  Q) = RV
0
[(x+ 1  )Q]: (10)
Next, I turn to check the stability of steady state equilibrium. From equation (9),
this steady state equilibrium is asymptotically stable i¤:
dQt+1
dQt
jQt=Q=
 U
00
(y  Q) RxV
00
[(x+ 1  )Q]
R(1  )V 00 [(x+ 1  )Q]
>  1: (11)
It is easy to verify that under the assumption that equation (11) holds, i.e.,  1 <
dQt+1
dQt
jQt=Q< 0, there exists one possible equilibrium time path for fQtg, and the
equilibrium is asymptotically stable.26 Note that if the above condition is not satised,
i.e., dQt+1
dQt
jQt=Q  1, the steady state equilibrium Q
 is unstable. In addition, while
a unique steady state Q can exist, there can also exist a continuum of (non-zero)
monetary equilibria that oscillate as they approach Q. Given that Qt+1=Qt = pt=pt+1,
this implies paying negative interest on CBDC allows for oscillations in the price level.
Thus, negative interest payments on digital money could open an economy to the
26One may refer to Smith (1991) for a similar discussion on the stability properties of the equilibrium.
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possibility of "excessive uctuations" in the price level. However, the focus of discussion
will be on deterministic stationary equilibria that arise when negative interest is paid
on CBDC.
3 Economic impact of negative rates on CBDC
The focus of my analysis is to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of negative interest
payments on CBDC. Let variables with a (^) denote the steady state equilibrium in
the absence of negative interest on CBDC. Recall that equilibrium values of variables
with negative net interest payments on CBDC are marked by a (). As shown below,
the key mechanism is agents consumption/saving decision, I shall start with young
agents saving behavior. A savings function is Qt = f(R), from equation (10),
f 0(R) =
V 0(c2)
 U 00(c1) R[x+ (1  )]V 00(c2)
> 0;8R (12)
which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium savings is an increasing function of the real gross return
R. Given that R  x + (1   )(1 + ), this implies savings is also an increasing
function of interest paid on CBDC (i.e., ).
Proof. See above discussions.
Also, It is immediately clear that with negative interest payments on central bank
digital currency, i.e.,  < 0, agents reduce their savings.27
Proposition 1. If  < 1 (or equivalently  > 0, so there is a legal requirement for
holding CBDC), R < R^ and Q < Q^.
Proof. The proof of R < R^ can be obtained from Lemma 1. I now turn to prove
Q < Q^. When CBDC earns no interest, it is easy to show that there exists a unique
27As shown before, I have also assumed that  >  1, so that CBDC yields a positive real return.
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steady state value for Qt, satisfying:
U
0
(y   Q^) = (x+ 1  )V
0
[(x+ 1  )Q^]: (13)
Suppose to the contrary that Q  Q^. Then from (13) and (10), U
0
(y  Q^) = (x+1 
)V
0
[(x+1 )Q^] > [x+(1 )(1+)]V
0
[(x+1 )Q] = RV
0
[(x+1 )Q] =
U
0
(y  Q). But given the assumption that U
0
> 0; U
00
 0, this would imply Q < Q^,
leading to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
One frequently-made argument for launching a negative interest rate on CBDC is
to overcome the e¤ective zero lower bound (ZLB) and thus further stimulate aggre-
gate consumption in response to severe adverse shocks (see, for example, Bordo and
Levin, 2017). As such, policymakers would be able to provide an appropriate degree
of monetary accommodation without relying on unconventional central bank policies,
such as quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance. This result is also obtained in
our benchmark economy in which a simple substitution e¤ect prevails.
Proposition 2. If  < 1, c1 > c^1.
Proof. Recall that c1 +Q
 = y = c^1 + Q^. Following the result of Proposition 1, the
proof is then immediate.
The intuition behind this proposition is fairly straightforward. In this perfect fore-
sight economy, as young agents face a lower perceived rate of return on their savings
when the government pays negative interest on CBDC, their consumption/saving deci-
sion induces them substitute savings for consumption, leading to a decrease in personal
savings and an increase in current consumption. Note that the wealth e¤ect of the de-
creased real rate of return on CBDC does not prevail, as it is completely o¤set by the
increased government subsidies, as discussed in equation (8).
Following Freeman and Hu¤man (1991), total real output (or GDP ) at t equals the
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total endowment (Nty) plus output generated by capital investment that was created
in the previous period. Because in period t   1 each individual created kt 1 units of
capital and there were Nt 1 of those individuals, real GDP in period t equals:
GDPt = Ny +Nxkt 1: (14)
Proposition 3. The payment of negative interest on CBDC causes a drop in real
output in the steady state, i.e., GDP  <\GDP .
Proof. Note that Q = (1 + )k and Q^ = (1 + )k^, k = Q and k^ = Q^.
Following the result of Proposition 1 Q < Q^, one gets k < k^. From (14), as N; y; x
are all exogenously given, real output in the steady state depends solely on the level of
capital stock. Since capital investment falls in the regime of negative rates on CBDC,
real output falls as well, i.e., GDP  <\GDP . Q.E.D.
By and large, the e¤ects of negative interest payments on the real side of the
economy can be summarized as follows. Paying negative interest on central bank digital
money induces agents to consume more and save less via a substitution e¤ect, which
on one hand boost current consumption, but on the other hand puts a drag on real
output due to reduced capital investment. Note that in this environment, monetary
policy has real e¤ects on the macroeconomy. And this happens without any nominal
rigidities as commonly assumed in the New Keynesian literature. Another important
task of my analysis is to evaluate the impact of this new monetary policy instrument
on the price level, which I turn to discuss.
Proposition 4. Negative interest payments on CBDC cause an increase in the
price level, i.e., p > p^.
Proof. In this model, real money balances are given by m = (1   )Q and
m^ = (1   )Q^. Since Q < Q^, following the result of Proposition 1, one immediately
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gets m < m^. In addition, the money market clearing condition requires that: mp =
m = m^p^. This in turn implies p > p^, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
The above result may seem unsurprising since one would expect that lowing interest
rates (i.e., monetary policy loosening) induces inationary pressures, even though the
interest rate paid on at money goes into negative territory. Indeed, this is the result
that one would typically obtain from the canonical New Keynesian model with sticky
prices or wages (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999). However, the underlying
mechanism is quite di¤erent in this model. In this economy the stock of CBDC is
xed, paying negative interest on government money lowers agents desired savings.28
In response, real money balances, as a pro rata share of total savings, also fall, and
there is a decline in the real demand for government money. As a result, the price
level has to increase to clear the money market. It is also interesting to note that the
results of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 indicate there is a price-output anomaly in
this benchmark economy. That is, exogenous variation in the real return on CBDC
can generate a business cycle with a countercyclical price-level.
Next, I explore the welfare implications of negative interest payments on CBDC
and restrict attention to the steady state utility. Clearly, the initial old are made worse
o¤ by this policy, due to a decline in real money balances. All generations except
the initial old are also worse o¤ when the government pays negative interest rates on
CBDC.
Proposition 5. Paying negative interest on CBDC makes the initial old generation
worse o¤, and it also reduces the welfare of all other generations.29
Proof. That the initial old are made worse o¤ follows from the proof of Proposition
28Note that the assumption that the stock of CBDC is xed is innocuous, and it is relaxed in the
next section. One could alternatively assume the stock of money follows some quantity rule, which
would not change the main results here.
29I have assumed here that the government acts as a "benevolent planner" with the objective of
maximizing agents utility in the steady state. With other objectives for the government, however,
the results could change.
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4, m < m^. That is, the payment of negative interest on CBDC reduces savings,
and hence real money balances. Endowed with a x stock of digital currency, the
real purchasing power of CBDC falls, which reduces the welfare of the initial old.
That all other generations are also made worse is proved as follows. Note that their
utility if CBDC earns no interest is W^ = U(y   Q^) + V [(x+ 1  )Q^], which I have
used R^  x + (1   ) and ^ = 0. Finding Q^ would need to satisfy (13). From
equation (8), it is also clear that their utility when CBDC earns negative interest is
W  = U(y   Q) + V [(x + 1   )Q]. However, from equation (13), by denition
W^ = U(y   Q^) + V [(x+ 1  )Q^]  W = U(y  Q) + V [(x+ 1  )Q];8Q 2 [0; y].
Moreover, the inequality is strict if Q 6= Q^, since V is a strictly concave function.
Alternatively, steady-state utility may be written as a function of , and W () =
U(y  Q()) + V [(x+ 1  )Q()]. One gets:
W 0() = (@Q=@)[ U 0 + (x+ 1  )V 0]: (15)
Substituting the rst-order condition (4) into (15) yields:
W 0() = (@Q=@)[ (1  )V 0]; (16)
which reveals that steady-state utility reaches a maximum at  = 0. Q.E.D.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 5 is straightforward. Each young agent
faces a lower expected return on money holdings when the government pays negative
interest on CBDC. Albeit they receive government subsidies when old, a substitution
e¤ect induces them to save less. Thus savings fall, so do real money balances, which
in turn results in the initial old realizing a capital loss on their CBDC. They therefore
are worse o¤ from this scheme. All young generations are also injured by the policy,
from a welfare perspective. Since the legal requirement on holding CBDC is binding
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at all times, in the aggregate, the social return to savings for young generation is
R^ = x + (1   ). However, each member of any young generation perceives the
private return on CBDC to be R = x+ (1  )(1 + ) < R^. From the perspective of
any young generation, paying negative interest on CBDC makes the return on savings
articially low, resulting in a low level of capital investment and output, which has
detrimental e¤ects on the economy. The payment of negative interest on CBDC simply
acts as a distortionary tax to savings, leading the public to demand ine¢ciently little
public money. Note that this result is also reminiscent of the "Friedman rule" (see
Friedman, 1969), which suggests to set the nominal interest rate at zerowith neither
a tax nor a subsidy on government money. The above analysis implies that paying
negative interest rates on CBDC does not seem to have clear welfare justications.
4 A model with government debt
To sharpen our understanding of the mechanics of negative interest payments on
CBDC, one crucial assumption made in the benchmark model is that there exists
only one type of government money, i.e., central bank digital currency. The key of the
analysis was a substitution e¤ect of consumption/saving induced by a negative interest
rate on government money. It is important to note that in the benchmark economy,
both capital investment and CBDC are proportional to total savings, and there are no
portfolio allocations among asset classes albeit agents hold two types of assets. That is,
for a given level of savings, agents would always hold the minimum amount of CBDC
required by the liquidity requirement and allocate the rest to capital investment, due
to the fact that the real return on CBDC is dominated by that on capital.
In this section, this assumption is relaxed and I introduce government debt into
the model. The motivations are twofold. First, in reality, there do exist other types of
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government money (or outside money), namely cash, bank reserves, and government
bonds.30 And crucially, these monetary assets (except cash) typically yield a positive
return.31 Would previous results still hold if we include other monetary assets? Second
and more importantly, introducing another asset allows us to analyze a non-trivial
portfolio e¤ect. How would agents make portfolio adjustments when they perceive a
lower return on CBDC? How would this change the macroeconomic impact of negative
interest rates on CBDC? These questions are thoroughly examined in this section.
4.1 The model economy
Following Champ et al. (2011) and Andolfatto (2015), I now lay out a stylized monetary
model with government debt. The physical setup is similar to that of the benchmark
model, and thus I shall keep the presentation as simple as possible. Note, nevertheless,
that the model di¤ers from the benchmark environment in two ways. First, I adopt
a standard production function where the rate of return on capital is endogenously
determined. As such, agents can make portfolio adjustments when they perceive a
change in the rate of interest on at money (see Freeman and Hu¤man, 1991). Second,
I consider a consolidated monetary/scal authority, which I call "the government". The
two authorities are interconnected by the government budget constraint (see Champ
and Freeman, 1990; Andolfatto, 2015).
30Note that since I consider a consolidated government sector, government bonds can be viewed as
money. In fact, both CBDC and government bonds are liabilities of the government. Moreover, as
CBDC is a replacement of physical cash, I consider a cashless economy. But unlike the benchmark
model, this economy does not need to be cashless per se. If the net interest rate on bonds is zero,
government bonds can be viewed as cash. Introducing cash is straightforward but would not change
my main results. Finally, banks reserves (also electronic central bank money) are generalized in our
"reserves for all" economy, thus I omit the discussion of bank reserves.
31Since the focus of my analysis is on the macroeconomic impact of negative interest payments on
government at money (i.e., CBDC), I restrict attention to public money and omit private money
(e.g., bank deposits) altogether.
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4.1.1 Preferences and technology
Time is discrete and denoted t = 1; 2; :::;1. The economy is populated by a sequence
of two-period-lived overlapping generations. At each date t  1, a unit mass of young
agents enter the economy and a unit mass of old agents leave the economy. In the
initial period, there also exists a unit mass of old agents, who live only for one period.
The total population is xed at 2N across time and is at every date t divided evenly
between the young and the old.
Agents of every generation t  1 are endowed with y units of output when young and
nothing when old. I assume individuals value consumption only in the second period
of life. For simplicity, I also assume that preferences are linear, thus, preferences are
given by Ut = ct+1, for t  0. As a result, the young face a trivial consumption-
saving decision: it will always be optimal for them to save all of their income, and the
substitution e¤ect of consumption/saving is shut down. This simplied consumption-
saving problem allows me to focus on a portfolio e¤ect, which I would like to emphasize
later.32
Instead of using a linear capital production technology, I assume the young possess
a standard investment technology, where kt units of output invested at date t yield
f(kt) units of output at date t + 1. The investment function yields a rate of return
f 0(k) > 0 that diminishes with the scale of the capital investment, f 00(k) < 0. Also
assume that f 0(0) = 1, so that agents would always prefer to have some investment.
Finally, I assume that capital depreciates fully after it is used in production.
32Incorporating a non-trivial consumption-saving problem is easy. But doing so would only compli-
cate the analysis without adding anything to the main points I intend to make in this section.
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4.1.2 Government policy
In what follows, I consider a consolidated monetary/scal authority, the government.
There are two nominal monetary assets, central bank digital currency (CBDC)Mt and
government bonds Bt, each issued by the government. Assume that both CBDC and
government bonds are perpetual instruments that yield gross nominal rates of return
equal to Rmt and R
b
t , respectively. Note that since the focus of discussion is on paying
negative interest on CBDC, Rmt  1; and by construction government bonds yield a
positive return, Rbt > 1. Assume that the interest and principal owed on maturing
government debt Rmt 1Mt 1+R
b
t 1Bt 1 must be nanced by a combination of new debt
Mt +Bt and a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) Tt,
33 that is,
Rmt 1Mt 1 +R
b
t 1Bt 1 = Tt +Mt +Bt: (17)
Let Dt denote the nominal value of the governments total outstanding debt at
date t, that is, Dt = Mt + Bt. In this modelling environment, I assume that the scal
authority determines the path of Dt and Tt, and the monetary authority determines
the path of interest rates Rmt and R
b
t . Note that equation (17) explicitly shows how
monetary and scal policy are interacted through the consolidated government budget
constraint. Next, I turn to characterize scal and monetary policy.
Fiscal policy. I assume that the scal authority grows the nominal government debt
(or government money) at a xed rate , so that,
Dt = Dt 1: (18)
As before, the initial amount of government money (CBDC and government bonds) is
injected to the initial old. I also assume that the scal authority passively adjusts the
33In this setup, central bank digital currency is de facto government debt.
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lump-sum tax (or subsidy) Tt to satisfy the government budget constraint, that is, scal
policy is Ricardian.34 As it proves to be convenient to express variables in real terms,
I let pt denote the date t price level and dene  t = Tt=pt, dt = Dt=pt, mt = Mt=pt,
which represent real taxes (or subsidies), real holdings of government money, and real
holdings of CBDC, respectively. Following (18), the government budget constraint is
rewritten as follows:
 t =
Rmt 1mt 1 +R
b
t 1(dt 1  mt 1)

  dt; (19)
where I have used the condition bt = Bt=Pt = dt mt, in which bt denotes real holdings
of government bonds. Again, I assume that the tax  t (or subsidy) falls entirely on the
old.
Monetary policy. Since the focus of analysis is on the economic impact of negative
interest on digital currency, I consider that the interest rate on CBDC is set exogenously
to some level Rm  1. The key exercise is to compare the case where CBDC earns no
interest (R^m = 1) with the case where CBDC earns negative interest (Rm; < 1). In
addition, I consider an interest peg policy: Rbt = R
b > 1. The stability of equilibrium
is checked later. Since digital currency and government bonds share identical risk
and liquidity characteristics in this setup, to motive a demand for CBDC when it is
dominated in rate of return (Rm < Rb) by bonds, again, a legal liquidity requirement
(or a reserve requirement) is imposed: mt  kt.
4.1.3 Optimal behavior
The young enter the economy with y units of real income. Since consumption is not
valued when young, all income is saved, with savings divided among the three available
34Note that Tt can also be interpreted as government surplus (or decit) if one include government
spending into the model.
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assets: CBDC, government bonds, and capital. Thus,
mt + bt + kt = y: (20)
Given a portfolio choice, future consumption is given by:
ct+1 = f(kt) +R
b(pt=pt+1)bt +R
m(pt=pt+1)mt    t+1: (21)
To characterize agents optimal behavior, substitute (20) into (21) and form the
expression:
Wt = f(kt) +R
b(pt=pt+1)(y  mt   kt) +R
m(pt=pt+1)mt    t+1 + t(mt   kt);
where Wt denotes expected consumption (or utility) and t  0 is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the liquidity requirement. Maximizing Wt with respect to mt
and kt yields the following conditions:
t = (R
b  Rm)(pt=pt+1); (22)
Rb(pt=pt+1) = f
0(kt)  t: (23)
Condition (22) shows that the liquidity requirement will bind tightly (t > 0) since
bonds strictly dominate CBDC in rate of return (Rb > Rm). In this case, mt = kt and
bt = y   (1 + )kt. Condition (23) implicitly denes the demand function for capital
investment. The left side of equation (23) represents the real return on government
bonds, whereas the right side of equation (23) represents the di¤erence between the rate
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of return on capital and the cost incurred by capital investing. Note that as the real
return on capital is endogenously determined, agents may make portfolio adjustments
in response to exogenous shocks. For instance, consider the case in which the liquidity
constraint is slack (t = 0), if the government suddenly increases R
b, agents would
choose to hold more bonds and less capital until the rate of return on capital equals
the real return on bonds.
In our experiment, the liquidity constraint is binding (t > 0). The expected
rate of return on capital would exceed the return on government bonds, f 0(kt) >
Rb(pt=pt+1), and agents would prefer to expand their capital spending. Doing so,
however, is costly in that agents would have to accumulate additional low-yield money
(i.e., negative-return CBDC) simultaneously. Hence, the liquidity requirement imposed
by the government serves as an e¤ective tax on capital investment.
To show the demand for capital investment more transparently, combine conditions
(22) and (23) to form:
f 0(kt) = [(1 + )R
b   Rm]=t+1; (24)
where t+1  pt+1=pt is dened as the gross ination rate. Condition (24) is essentially
the Fisher equation, which equates the real interest rate to the ination-adjusted rate
of return on government debt.
4.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the market for CBDC and government debt must clear. The market
clearing conditions are given by:
Mt = PtNmt; (25)
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Bt = PtNbt; (26)
for all t  1. Since Dt =Mt +Bt, we also have:
Dt=N = ptdt: (27)
Note that equation (27) determines the price level in this economy. Because Dt =
Dt 1, the expected rate of ination satises:
t+1 = pt+1=pt = (Dt+1=Dt)(dt=dt+1) = (dt=dt+1): (28)
Next, combine (28) and (24), together with kt = y   dt, to get:
f 0(y   dt) = [
(1 + )Rb   Rm

](
dt+1
dt
): (29)
Since the liquidity requirement binds, i.e., mt = kt, one gets:
mt = (y   dt): (30)
Finally, from the government budget constraint, we have:
 t =
Rmt 1mt 1 +R
b
t 1(dt 1  mt 1)

  dt: (31)
An equilibrium in this model consists of bounded sequences for dt, mt, and  t, given
a policy vector (Rm; Rb; ), that satisfy (29), (30), and (31), for t  1. A stationary
equilibrium is dened as an equilibrium that satises (dt;mt;  t) = (d;m; ), for all t.
In a similar setup, Andolfatto (2015) shows that the equilibrium has a simple recursive
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structure. In this model, given initial values of CBDC and government bonds, equation
(29) determines fdtg
1
t=1. With dt determined, equation (30) determines the sequence
of mt. With fdt;mtg so determined, equation (31) then determines the lump-sum tax
(or subsidy)  t that is used to balance the government budget.
Let us now characterize the equilibrium path of dt. In addition, let us assume
0 < d < 1, this means in the steady state equilibrium the real purchasing power of
government money never goes to zero, and d !1 is also ruled out because it violates
feasibility constraint: dt  y for all t. Dene A
 1  [ (1+)R
b
 Rm

] > 0, and (29) is
rewritten as:
dt+1 = Af
0(y   dt)dt  G(dt): (32)
Given the assumption that f is strictly concave, it is easy to verify that there exists a
unique (non-zero) stationary equilibrium, satisfying 1 = Af 0(y   d).35 Then, one can
use equations (30) and (31) to solve for m and  . Note that under an interest rate
peg policy, there exists a continuum of nonstationary equilibria indexed by the initial
condition d0 2 (0; d
) with the property that dt ! 0.
36 Again, the focus of analysis is
on the stationary equilibrium.
4.3 Negative interest rates on CBDC
As before, the key exercise is to compare the equilibria with and without negative
interest payments on CBDC. Let us start by characterizing the steady state level of
capital investment k, when the government pays negative interest on digital currency.
From equation (29), we get:
35Technically, there also exists a degenerate equilibrium, d = 0, which is ruled out by our assumption.
36The stability properties of the equilibrium are familiar in OLG models with at money, where
the return on money is pegged. This set of nonstationary equilibria are ruled out by our assumption.
Note also that there are no equilibria if the initial condition satises d0 2 (d
;1).
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f 0(k) =
(1 + )Rb   Rm;

: (33)
Proposition 6. Capital investment is lower in the policy regime in which the
government pays a negative interest rate on CBDC, i.e., k < k^.
Given that Rm; < R^m = 1 and f
00
(k) < 0 < f 0(k), it is immediately clear from
(33) that k is increasing in Rm, so that k < k^. Recall from conditions (22) and
(23) that, intuitively, the payment of negative interest on CBDC increases the tax on
capital spending. In response, agents cut their capital investment and reach the new
equilibrium. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. As Rm falls, the tax on capital spending increases, i.e.,  > ^.
Following equation (33), it is interesting to note that a higher Rb or a lower 
can also induce agents to reduce their capital investment. This is because both policy
actions would increase the real return on government bonds, and induce a portfolio
substitution away from capital into government bonds.
Corollary 2. Capital investment is increasing in  and decreasing in Rb.
Similar to (14), GDP in this economy can be dened as:
GDPt = Ny +Nf(kt 1): (34)
Proposition 7. Paying negative interest on CBDC causes a fall in real output in
the steady state, i.e., GDP  <\GDP .
Following the result of Proposition 6, one gets k < k^. From (34), as N and y
are exogenously set, real output in the steady state would depends solely on the level
of capital stock. Since capital spending falls when the government pays a negative
interest rate on CBDC, real output falls as well, GDP  <\GDP .
Notice that the results of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 are consistent with those
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of the benchmark economy discussed before such that paying negative interest on
CBDC reduces capital investment and real output. However, the underlying mechanism
is completely di¤erent. In the benchmark model, earning negative interest on CBDC
induces agents to save less and consume more, and the key mechanism is a substitution
e¤ect. As total savings fall, so do real money balances and capital investment. In the
current model with government debt, however, a fall in capital spending (and the
subsequent drop in real output) works through a portfolio e¤ect, shown as follows. The
payment of negative interest on CBDC cause an increase in the tax on capital spending,
making capital become less attractive than government bonds. As the expected real
return on bonds does not change (i.e., Rb= in the steady state), agents would make
portfolio adjustments to hold more bonds and less capital. This in turn causes a fall
in real output.
In addition, such a portfolio allocation decision has interesting implications on the
monetary sector, which I now tend to discuss.
Proposition 8. If Rm; < R^m, m < m^ and b > b^.
Corollary 3. If Rm; < R^m, d > d^.
Proof. From equation (30) m = (y   d), it is easy to show @m
@d
=   < 0, so that
real holdings of CBDC is decreasing in d in the steady state. Following the result of
Proposition 6, k < k^, and given that k + d = y = k^ + d^, it is obvious that d > d^,
implying that agents increase their holdings of government money. Thus, m < m^. In
addition, given d > d^ and m < m^, together with d = m + b and d^ = m^ + b^, one
gets b > b^. Q.E.D.
Paying negative interest on central bank digital currency increases the tax on capi-
tal spending, thus productive capital is less attractive as an asset group. There is then
a "ight to quality" towards government bonds, and total government debt increases.
However, despite the increase in the total demand for government money, agents hold-
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ings of CBDC falls due to the drop in capital investment. Thus, such a policy has
di¤erent e¤ects on the holdings of government bonds and CBDC, which has important
implications on the price level.
Proposition 9. Paying negative interest on CBDC can cause a decline in the price
level, i.e. pt < p^t.
Proof. From equation (27), we have Dt=N = ptdt. In this economy, the path of Dt
is determined by the scal authority through Dt = Dt 1, which also implies the long-
run ination rate is anchored by . Since Rm; < R^m, d > d^, and that ptd
 = p^tdt, we
immediately have pt < p^t. Q.E.D.
Interestingly, the above result shows that negative interest payments on CBDC
can cause a decrease, instead of an increase, in the price level, inducing a transitory
deation. This result is di¤erent from that of the benchmark model and may seem
surprising. The economic reasoning is as follows. Although in both economies the
holdings of CBDC fall, the introduction of government debt opens up the possibility
of an increase in the demand for government money.37 Due to a portfolio allocation
decision, agents hold more bonds and less capital in their portfolio. The increase in
the demand for bonds dominates the fall in CBDC holdings, thereby the demand for
public money increases.38 To clear the money market, the price level now needs to fall.
My analysis makes it clear that, ultimately, it is the total demand for government
money that inuences the price level in the economy. The result shows that driving
the interest rate into negative territory does not necessarily cause ination if agents
can make portfolio adjustments and substitute for other types of government money.39
37Recall that both CBDC and government bonds serve as money in this economy.
38Following the result of Corollary 3, d > d^, the increase in the real demand for government money
is unambiguous.
39Note that the welfare e¤ects of such a policy is ambiguous and are ultimately determined by the
marginal productivity of capital. To show this, write steady-state utility (or equivalently consumption)
as a function of d, and W (d) = c(d) = f(y   d) + R
bb

+ R
mm

   . Given that b = d   m and
 = R
mm+Rb(d m)

  d, the above function can be simplied as: W (d) = f(y   d) + d. Note that
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It is also worth noting that the model is in the same spirit of the quantity theory of
money. With the quantity of government money being determined exogenously, one
simply needs to track the demand for government money, in order to understand the
changes in the price level. For example, when the demand for money is high, due
to a portfolio substitution for bonds, the value of money (i.e., 1=p ) has to increase,
inducing deation.40
5 Conclusion
In an era where physical cash is becoming increasingly vestigial in legal transactions,
and where technological advances have opened the door to the negative interest pay-
ment on electronic money, it is perhaps time to stop treating the zero lower bound
(ZLB) as a natural constraint and start considering negative interest rate policy. The
appearance of privately-issued monies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, has also triggered
a wave of interest among major central banks in exploring sovereign digital currency.
To overcome the ZLB, the most direct, and arguably the easiest, approach is to pay
negative interest on central bank digital currency (CBDC). This paper provides, for
the rst time, a formal analysis to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of negative
interest rates on CBDC through the lens of a neoclassical general equilibrium model
with monetary aggregates. In the benchmark model, agents have access to two types of
assets: CBDC and productive capital. The demand for digital currency is motivated
by a liquidity requirement (or a reserve requirement). I show that paying negative
interest on CBDC induces agents to save less and consume more via a substitution
d = y k, we have W (k) = f(k)+y k, and W 0(k) = f 0(k) 1. Of course, the initial old benet from
paying negative interest on CBDC, because real money balances increase. Since I have assumed non-
standard preferences to ease exposition, I omit the discussion of welfare implications in this section.
40In the benchmark economy, however, paying negative interest on CBDC causes a fall in savings,
and thus a fall in the demand for money, which induces inationary pressures.
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e¤ect. A drop in savings in turn causes a fall in capital investment, subsequent output,
and real money balances. To clear the money market, the price level has to increase.
I then extend the model to include positive-yielding government bonds. This allows
me to study a non-trivial portfolio e¤ect: when the government pays a negative interest
rate on CBDC, the tax on agents capital spending increases, inducing a decrease in
capital investment and an increase in government bonds in agents portfolio. Such a
policy causes a drop in investment and output. However, there is a transitory decline in
the price level due to a "ight to quality" (i.e., government bonds). That is, although
there is a fall in the holdings of CBDC, the real demand for bonds increases by more
due to the portfolio e¤ect. As a result, real holdings of government money actually
increase, and the price level has to decline to clear the money market. Overall, my
analysis shows that there exists a trade-o¤ in implementing negative interest payments
on CBDC: such a policy can boost consumption and may induce ination, but at the
cost of causing a fall in capital investment and output.
No doubt that both negative interest rate policy and CBDC constitute major shifts
in macroeconomics thinking, with important implications for payment systems, nan-
cial stability, and the whole economy. This study focuses on the macroeconomic impact
of negative rates on CBDC and provides a rst step into this issue. Note that the results
draw from a stylized yet rigorous model that abstracts from several important aspects
in real-world settings, including the absence of uncertainty and an explicit banking
sector. However, it is not immediately clear how extending the model to account for
these considerations would change the essential points made in this paper. Future
research should devote to answering this question. Note also that negative interest
rates on CBDC are certainly no panacea for all of an economys ills, and they can have
potential side-e¤ects as summarized above. They do not substitute for other macro-
economic policies, such as scal policy and macroprudential policy. Understanding the
34
interactions between negative rates and other economic policies is also interesting.
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